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Abstract–This study develops a unique model of organizational resilience architecture with an emphasis 
on the ways in which organizations respond to cyber-attacks. The model elucidates the dynamics and 
approaches through which organizations mobilize and utilize expertise and resources to combat the 
effects of cyber-attacks on normal business operations. Drawing on recent cases of cyber-attacks against 
organizations, the study identifies a host of strategic and tactical responses victims used to aid recovery 
and return to daily activities. The responses are grouped into three stages to demonstrate the steps that 
organizations can take to enhance their resilience: Stage 1 focuses on proactive environmental scanning 
and locating potential threats and attacks, Stage 2 emphasizes neutralizing threats and attacks, and Stage 
3 focuses on re-designing, upgrading and updating human, technological and financial resources. On 
this basis, the study sheds light on levels of organizational resilience and strategies for organizational 
design in withstanding cyber-attacks and security breaches. The theoretical and practical implications 
of these findings are discussed.   
Managerial Relevance Statement–It is increasingly becoming clear that no 21st century 
business can survive without technology fueling some, or all, of its operations. While this points to an 
incredibly exciting era, the pervasiveness of technology, has also made organizations vulnerable to 
vicious cyber-attacks. The 12 months prior to March 2018 alone saw 53,000 reported cases of such 
attacks across 63 countries. Organizations are clearly not oblivious of the imminent threat and 
consequences that cyber-attacks pose to them. However, for most, this awareness breeds panic due to 
a lack of knowledge on which responses are effective for successfully managing threats and attacks. In 
this paper, we propose a simple model which organizations can seamlessly incorporate to fight against 
cyber-attacks. We realize from victim stories that it is impossible to completely prevent cyber-attacks, 
thus, our model is not aimed at making organizations completely protected. Instead, based on previous 
research pointing to the relevance of recovery efforts, we have drawn on lessons from victims to suggest 
simple ways organizations can identify sources of threats and recover quickly from the effects of 
attacks.   




Fueled by technological breakthroughs, liberalization and deregulations, the world as we know 
it has become progressively borderless. In parallel, there has been a boom in the use of media and 
technology in most, if not all, spheres of human activity. Together, these changes have opened 
organizations up to unwarranted external parties and made them vulnerable to vicious attacks. Indeed, 
threats from the external environment have surged in the 21st century, with cyber-attacks becoming a 
regular experience of many organizations [1].  Cyber-attacks are deliberate attempts by an individual 
or organization to paralyze the information systems of another organization; the acts are aimed at 
compromising ‘the confidentiality, integrity and availability of data’ [2, p. 25]. Such attacks, also 
referred to as digital terrorisms, cyber-crimes and cyber-terrorisms, have dire consequences for affected 
organizations, including loss of productive days, service disruptions, huge costs towards recovery of 
systems, humongous legal fines to compensate individuals whose data have been compromised and 
huge dents in brand image [3]. As expected, firms of all sizes and configurations, have become more 
attentive to cyber threats [4]–[7] and are increasingly seeking to develop more proactive and robust 
routines and processes to improve their chances of survival when attackers strike.   
Yet, lacking in current research is an examination of how organizations move on from mere 
reactive responses to developing resilience. In fact, in spite of the upward body of work on cyber-
attacks and their effects on organizations [5], we still lack a solid understanding of how organizations 
can orchestrate resources and expertise to successfully respond to such attacks. Research indications 
from various fields in strategic management point to resilience as a key attribute organizations can use 
to deal with environmental upheavals [8]–[10]. Organizational resilience manifests in various ways and 
may include efforts towards scouting internal and external environments for possible threats, 
demonstrating abilities to avoid, or recover from shocks of attacks, and flexibility in operations [11]. 
Depending on the nature of threat and the kind of organization affected, a combination of responses in 
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relation to these abilities can ensure survival and a total recovery from many high-impact, yet 
unanticipated risks [12]. Existing studies indicate that enhanced organizational resilience in the face of 
crises is crucial for wider communities, even beyond the organizations involved. This is because, 
reduced interruptions to operations during crises ensure quick recovery of the routines and processes 
of connected businesses and in turn, continuance of normal lifestyles within societies [13]. According 
to Liu, et al. [14, p. 401], organizational architecture broadly denotes, the ‘clear task-to-organization 
unit mapping in an organizational hierarchy that makes tasks interdependent within and independent 
between organizational units’. It is also an adaptable outline of the ‘workings of organizations’, 
including how resources and activities are coordinated for effective decision making [15]. 
In the current digital era, appropriating resilience to survive the increasing spate of cybercrimes 
against organizations is indispensable. The reliance on digital devices within organizations and across 
supply chains has come with a parallel increase in unscrupulous activities that infiltrate, compromise 
and often render digital devices and the information they hold, inaccessible. Of the many organizational 
responses, the ability to ‘continuously deliver intended outcomes’ during attacks [16], [17] could be 
the most important for long term survival. Nevertheless, existing literature is yet to systematically 
consider the ways in which organizations can achieve the resilience needed for the much-needed 
business recovery and continuity. Against this backdrop, this study proposes an organizational 
resilience architecture that expounds the ways in which businesses can leverage resources and expertise 
to respond to cyber-attacks. Based on insights from relevant literature a conceptual model of 
organizational resilience architecture is developed (see Fig. 1). We use illustrative cases from twenty-
one organizations to shed light on the model and suggest ways by which organizations can benefit from 
lessons learnt by victim organisations.  
Our study makes key contributions to research on resilience and cyber-attacks. Firstly, we 
integrate insights from organizational resilience studies [18], [19] to develop an organizational model  
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against cyber-attacks. For resilience-related decisions in particular, an organisational architecture 
elucidates how organizations can develop the processes and routines needed to become more robust in 
an era of increasing upheavals. Secondly, while organizational resilience is considered crucial for 
organizations facing all sorts of crises, a recent review of influential studies on the topic in business 
and management research, found that in terms of contexts, attention had mostly been paid to accident 
and disasters [20]. None of the influential studies reviewed had been done in the specific context of 
cyber systems. This is surprising given that complexities and uncertainties surrounding cyber-attacks 
such as their ability to fester in cyber systems for years without the awareness of victim organizations, 
present a unique form of adversity, whose study could introduce fresh insights to current knowledge 
on organizational resilient responses. This study draws on illustrations from a wide range of 
organizations to contribute to efforts towards building a resilience literature relevant for cyber 
adversities. In addition, our paper’s focus on cyber-attacks, an adversity which is difficult to avoid [21], 
and corresponding alignment with definitions of resilience as ensuring business continuity during 
adversities [22], allow for a more realistic and relevant operationalization of the concept of resilience 
in organizations. Thirdly, inter-organizational comparisons are a pivotal component of competitive 
organizations. In line with this, our study, which pulls together lessons from previous incidents across 
various organizations present a potent resource to support future organizations in enhancing their own 
resilience [23]. In particular, our study equips organizational leaders with up-to-date expertise and 
superior intellect to make decisions, which are able to enrich their organizations’ responses to cyber-
attacks.   
The paper begins by providing a brief overview of the organizational resilient literature. On the 
basis of the review, we developed a conceptual model. This is followed by using cases of organizations 
affected by cyber-attacks to illustrate the features of our model. The final section presents the 
discussion, implications and future research flowing from the findings. 
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II. ORGANIZATIONAL RESILIENCE ARCHITECTURE: A CONCEOTUAL MODEL 
A. Resilience and cyber-attacks  
A cyber-attack is any type of offensive maneuvering that targets information systems, 
infrastructures, computer networks, or personal IT devices. It is often aimed at gaining control of these 
systems and compromising their confidentiality, integrity and availability [24]. Uma and Padmavathi 
[25] grouped cyber-attacks into five categories, falling under the attackers’ intent, severity of 
involvement, scope of the attack, network type and legal classifications. Ghadge et al. [26] found that 
cyber risks could be grouped according to physical threats, breakdowns, indirect attacks, direct attacks 
and insider threats. As a result of the highly specialized nature of cyber systems and associated attacks, 
the bulk of current research on management strategies, is understandably technical, focusing on 
computing algorithm developments [27], developing new analytical techniques for performing 
vulnerability analysis, or stating estimations when an attack involves false data injection on information 
systems [28], [29].  
In strategic management circles, few suggestions have emerged on measures to manage cyber-
attacks, mostly in supply chain research. Here, Ghadge et al. [26], in their recent review found that 
researchers mostly focus on management strategies in the pre-attack phase. This involves technical 
(e.g. password protection and firewalls) and human measures (e.g. security awareness and 
commitment) aimed at warding off attackers or increasing early human/employee interventions to stall 
attacks. Other measures are in the form of using distributed blockchain-based data to protect modern 
power systems against cyber-attacks [30]. However, examples from victim organizations suggest that 
while this stage could be useful for spotting threats, no amount of preparation is enough to make 
organizations completely immune to cyber-attacks [21]. The Singaporean Minister of Health, for 
instance, in response to measures the ministry had put in place after an attack on SingHealth commented 
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‘We will do our utmost to secure our IT systems. ‘However, unfortunately, we cannot completely 
eliminate the risk of another cybersecurity attack’ (Minister of Health, SingHealth, 2018). In fact, the 
illusion of safety that come with such protections could make organizations complacent, and often 
unaware of attacks on their systems until long after it has started [23], [31]. Thus, in the pre-attack 
phase, organizations would benefit more from organizing themselves in anticipation or preparation for 
(rather than avoidance of) a possible attack.  
There is also a clear need for more research attention on how organizations can manage their 
activities in the trans-attack (during) and post-attack (after) stages to manage and ensure business 
continuity [26]. Few studies from relevant fields have offered some suggestions. For instance, Van 
Hardevald et al. [32] pay attention to identifying potential pitfalls in the activities of carders (a group 
of cyber criminals who target credit card information), which may signal appropriate routes for security 
personnel to track down and apprehend them. Others, relying on the theory of attribution offer ways to 
identify the origin of attacks as part of efforts to contain them [33]. Other responses include the need 
to document all stages of the attack and tap into insurance covers [34], [35]. In advancing knowledge 
on positive organizational responses, Sheppard et al. [31] proposed a Cyber First AID plan, which 
requires organizations to have adaptable plans that are able to be configured in response to the 
unpredictable nature of cyberattacks, ensure that efforts to manage attacks are integrated throughout 
the organization, and deliberate at regularly reviewing plans, practices and clarity of individual roles.  
At the centerpiece of premier competitive organizations, strategic resilience has gained 
increased attention from scholars in strategy and operations management [36]. Organizational 
resilience has sometimes been defined as a firms’ ability to proactively scan their environment, identify 
looming and evolving threats, institute contingency measures to tackle known threats, and  prepare for 
unknowns [36], [37], [38]. Resilience can also be construed as ‘the capacity to adapt existing resources 
and skills to new situations and operating conditions’ [13, p. 21]. Other definitions of the concept  focus 
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on capabilities and practices that allow recovery by an individual or organization to a previously stable 
and functioning state, following an adversity [20], [38]. In line with the latter, resilience can be 
conceptualized as a core strength that organizations demonstrate, to mitigate and reduce the impact of 
crises, including natural disasters, industrial accidents, global economic downturns and product 
failures. Unfortunately, this latter, and more holistic conception of resilience is not often coupled with 
research in crises management. As Williams et al. [40] note, resilient actors are assumed to escape or 
avoid crises. In addition, the focus of most studies, as Linnenluecke [20] documents in a review of 
influential papers on resilience in business and management, have been on organizational responses in 
the context of accidents, disasters, organizational behavior or supply chains. 
Given the complexity, unpredictable and rapidly cascading nature of risks that cyber-attacks 
present, traditional approaches to fortifying cyber systems against attacks may not bear needed results. 
This makes organizational resilience – the ability to ensure business continuity in the face of attacks – 
an important management strategy. According to [22], this understanding of resilience, proactively 
built into organizational processes can be a distinct source of competitive advantage businesses which 
survive attacks wield over counterparts who do not. Linkov and Kott [21], use the example of biological 
systems to explain the centrality of organizational resilience for managing cyberattacks. As biological 
systems build their immunity over time to adapt and bounce back when attacked by infections, so too 
must cyber systems and the organizations in which they operate develop immunities, in the form of 
resilience, not just to adapt, but also recover from attacks. In this study, we recognize the incredible 
need for this understanding and implementation of resilience within organizations. We, thus, adopt a 
similar definition to that of Linkov and Kott [21], of what has now become known as cyber resilience, 
considering it as firms’ practices and responses that enable anticipation, recovery, absorption and/or 
overcoming setbacks induced by cyber adversities. However, we are reluctant to adopt the term cyber 
resilience strictly for our study, as resilient practices and responses to managing cyber-attacks are 
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inevitably linked to and affected by resilience in other organizational processes. We consider 
organizational resilience for managing cyber-attacks a more appropriate conceptualization of the 
central focus of our paper.  
An area of relevant research interest relates to how organizations can enhance their resilience. 
First, organizations may adopt and embed new and innovative business models [41], [42], [43]. This 
often require taking a holistic approach to reconfiguring organizations to be able to bounce back after 
disruptions to their processes, systems, routines or overall business strategy. Some organizations may 
even institutionalize these models into an architecture, which can be adapted to confront impending or 
actualized threats [42]. Second, as Crichton et al. [23] indicate, organizations do not necessarily have 
to go through disruptions themselves to build their resilience. Instead, there are a wealth of lessons to 
be learnt from counterparts that have been victims to different catastrophes. While contexts and nature 
of attacks may differ, the authors note underlying similarities in elements of previous incidents in 
different years, which offer common lessons that could have lessened the impact of current attacks. 
Examples of lessons could be ways to prevent catastrophic hazards in sensitive industries to appropriate 
ways managers can communicate updates with multiple stakeholders. Third, the available literature 
documents the potential positive effects on firms’ ability to overcome environmental threats via 
leveraging internal and external resources, such as expertise and funding. External expertise and 
resources can be built by deliberately collaborating with relevant networks [28], and forging alliances 
that are relevant for enhancing resilience [44].  
Internally, firms should ensure they have financial reserves to rely on during crises. This is 
essential to avoid resorting to layoffs, a response which often undermines key social relationships and 
erodes trust among organizational members, making recovery efforts difficult or impossible [45]. They 
should also be able to attract and retain top talents and translate such intellectual capabilities into 
improved performance relating to responses to threats [11]. In other words, accumulation of relevant 
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human capital, which involves harnessing top talents is one way for organizations to counteract and 
respond to cyber-attacks. The organizational learning literature offers a pathway to explain this. 
Organizations broadly learn when employees are able to mobilize and utilize internal and external 
information to inform decisions, routines and processes [46]. This means possession of up-to-date 
knowledge and insights is essential in seeking to develop market advantages induced by resilience. It 
is worth noting, however, that to improve speed and rate of recovery and business function during 
cyber-attacks, training and upgrading employees would be useful for all employees across departments, 
regardless of their expertise in cyber systems.   
According to [47], the two key enablers of enterprise resilience are: (1) the capability of an 
enterprise to connect systems, people, processes and information in a way that taps into a synergy of 
responses  to the dynamics of its environment, stakeholders and competitors. This requires inter- and 
intra-level interoperability and integration within the extended enterprise and (2) the alignment of 
information technology with business goals, which requires modelling of the underlying technology 
infrastructure and creation of a consolidated view of and access to, all available resources in the 
extended enterprises that can be attained by a well-defined enterprise architecture. In line with this 
approach, Rajesh [48] identified eleven major technological capabilities for resilience in supply chains 
including capabilities to modify SC design, capabilities of supply flexibility, capabilities of capacity 
enhancements, level of standardization, agile capabilities, collaborative capabilities, postponement 
capabilities, inventory capabilities, product rollover capabilities, pricing capabilities and planning 
capabilities. Enhancements of these capabilities according to [48] augments flexibilities while also 
increasing capabilities of resilience in supply chains.  
Finally, and in one of the most important research advances on crises management in general 
[49], and cyber-attacks in particular [50] have noted the importance for timely measures to ensure 
continuance of business activities when crises strike. Such timely responses, which align with 
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expectations of resilient organizations should be activated immediately crises factors are determined to 
neutralize and contain problems. At this stage, organizations should be able to tap into relational and 
cognitive resources that ensure business functions adjust positively to disruptions [51]. This is often 
indispensable for the organization to remain operational and to prevent liquidation. A summary of some 
key studies on resilience is presented in Table 1. 
The studies discussed so far have suggested how organizational resilience may be particularly 
useful for successful management of cyber-attacks and signaled some ways of enhancing such 
resilience. The literature also points to a preference for considering resilience as ways to ensure 
business continuity during adversities [20], conceptions which we have aligned our study with. 
According to [21], however, the science or ‘methods’ of resilience are to be prioritized over the 
metaphors or ‘concepts’, which has till date been the focus of organizational resilience research. Indeed, 
due to its high-magnitude and increasingly current nature, practical representations of organizational 
resilience in the context of cyber-attacks are urgently needed.  
Such practical organizational responses to threats by organizations may be limited by incorrect 
search of relevant causes of actions [52]. Building on key insights from the reviews above, we propose 
an organizational resilience model that could help ensure continued business function when confronted 
with cyber-attacks. Our proposed model, as demonstrated in Fig. 1 elucidates three stages: Stage 1: 
Proactive environmental scanning and locating potential threats and attacks, Stage 2: Neutralizing 
threats and attacks, and Stage 3: Re-designing, upgrading and updating human, technological and 
financial resources. To elaborate the stages in more detail, we utilize illustrative cases and highlight 





SUMMARY OF SOME KEY STUDIES ON RESILIENCE 
Studies Methods Key Findings  
[47] Literature Review, Position Paper The study takes the view of enterprises as extended systems and focuses on a framework that identifies attributes of resilience in such enterprises. 
The findings reveal that the capability of an enterprise to connect systems, people, processes and information in a way that allows enterprises to 
become more connected and responsive to the dynamics of its environment, stakeholders and competitors. Further, a business is  suggested to 
decrease vulnerability, increase flexibility, adaptability and agility for the extended enterprise. 
[36] Literature Review, Position Paper This study develops an understanding of how organizations can build capacity for resilience (such as specific cognitive abilities, behavioral 
characteristics and contextual conditions) through strategic Human Resource Management. The findings propose that a company should equip 
core employees and units to achieve desired contributions to resilience through their actions when establishing HR policies and practices. 
Combining the individual contributions through the process of a two-way interaction and attraction-selection-attrition will ensure further effective 
capacity for resilience. 
[53] Literature Review This study proposes that Collaborative Networks (CNs) play an important facilitating role in enhancing resilience. Two main classes of CNs have 
been identified: breeding environments or strategic alliances focused on preparedness for collaboration and goal-oriented networks. The findings 
suggest that CNs collaborations are not only to support businesses survive, but also be a source of knowledge and new opportunities in uncertain 
contexts. 
[48] A relational analysis using Total Interpretive 
Structural Modelling (TISM) and a case evaluation 
approach are used to demonstrate the major 
technological capabilities of firms that influence 
resilient capabilities of supply chains.  
To achieve resilience in supply chains, this study identifies 11 technological capabilities, including capability to modify SC design, capability of 
supply flexibilities, capability of capacity enhancements, inventory capabilities, product rollover capabilities, postponement capabilities, level of 
standardization, agile capabilities, collaborative capabilities, pricing capabilities and planning capabilities. Enhancement of these capabilities 
supplements flexibilities while also increasing capabilities of resilience in supply chains.  
[23] Empirical based on official information of seven 
major incidents  
 
This research proposes that organizations can enhance their resilience by learning lessons from past incidents – including those occurring in 
different contexts. The authors identify recurring themes/lessons from 7 incidents of different parameters and locations that can be applied across 
sectors. Examples of lessons include emphasizing the process of emergency processes, training responders in non-technical skills and 
communicating with the public.  
[20] A review of influential publications This study indicates that resilience is considered as strengths, perseverance, and recovery capabilities that organizations and employees 
demonstrate when encountering adversity. The findings reveal that conceptualizations of resilience differ across research streams. In addition, 
conceptual similarities and differences among these streams as well as insights that can be generalized to other contexts are yet to be explored, 
and third, few empirical insights for detecting resilience to future adversity (or the absence thereof). Possible areas of future research are the 
context of resilience organizing for resilience, measuring resilience and multi-level and cross-disciplinary work.  
[38] Qualitative Multiple Case-Study The research investigates three organizations that had experienced disruptions to examine their processes of response at the onset of disruptions 
and to identify the factors that determine different configurations of building resilience. The findings show that responses depended on the nature 
of incident and the organization’s ability to collect, analyze, interpret, and utilize information effectively. Further, an organization’s response, 
which the authors argued reflects their resilience depends on how prepared they are (monitoring internal and external environments to quickly 
respond to threats) and their capabilities to adapt.  
[54] Conceptual Focuses on detecting and activating relevant responses within an organization against adversities. This study proposes a resi lient response 
framework, which entails detecting possible threats and taping into relational and cognitive resources to mitigate any consequences on business 
operations.   
[45] Empirical case study based on publicly available 
data   
Based on an investigation of how some airlines succeeded after the 9/11 attacks, the findings of this study reveal that availability of financial 
reserves and an available business model are key to resilience and survival after a crisis. Organizations lacking these two often respond to crises 
with layoffs. While temporarily efficient, layoffs inhibit recovery in the years after a crisis, and perhaps in the long term, because it undermines 
social relationships needed for long term resilience.  
[43] Conceptual The authors argue that organizations should be willing to reinvent business models and strategies while anticipating and adjusting to changes in 
order to build capabilities in strategic resilience. To do this, organizations should address four challenges; conquering denial (avoid illusions of 
safety and embrace realities of a changing world), valuing variety (e.g., experiment to increase opportunities for stable revenues by expanding 
sources of revenues), liberating resources (invest in promising ideas), and embracing paradoxes (encourage both exploitation and exploratory 




Fig. 1.  Organizational resilience model for responding to cyber-attacks 
III. DESIGN AND DATA 
Following [23], we sourced cases from a wide range of sectors (e.g., telecommunication, travel 
and transport, governments and local councils, entertainment, health and freight) and countries (e.g., 
United Kingdom, United Arab Emirates, United States, Singapore, etc.) to collate lessons for resilience. 
All the cases chosen had recovered after having their operations tremendously affected by a cyber-attack 
between 2010-2018. To various extents, they had all also demonstrated resilience by ensuring business 
continuity during the attack. We elucidated common patterns in the responses in line with our model with 
the aim of equipping organizational leaders with up-to-date expertise to inform decisions that enrich their 
organizations’ approaches and responses to cyber-attacks. The cross-sector and cross-national nature of 
the cases means that the findings underlying our model are enlightening to many organizations regardless 
of their culture or location [23]. This approach of highlighting lessons from a wide range of cases has 
also been found to be particularly effective in bringing new light to existing phenomena [49], [55]. The 
specific responses presented were sourced from press commentaries and corporate statements made on 
company websites and blogs (Appendix 1). In all, we identified twenty-one illustrative examples/cases 
and synthesized the insights in what follows.  
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A. Stages in Responding to Cyber-attacks: Applications and Examples  
 In the following section, we employ twenty-one cases of cyber-attacks to buttress the three stages 
of developing resilience reflected in the dimensions of our model. The cases and relevant background 
stories are summarized in Appendix 1.  
1) Stage 1: Proactive environmental scanning and locating threats and attacks 
This stage focuses on scanning and spotting threats and attacks. To exemplify the actions that 
organizations exhibit in operationalizing this stage, we turn to steps victim-organizations, including the 
National Health Service (NHS) England, TalkTalk and Carphone Warehouse have undertaken to scan 
and spot threats.  
a) NHS England 
In 2017, NHS England was one of the victims of the most widespread cyber-attacks that affected 
corporations worldwide. WannaCry, as cyber-security experts named this attack, encrypted data on 
infected computers and made it impossible for users to access their files. In all, 34% of NHS Trusts faced 
severe disruptions to services. 6, 912 appointments were cancelled, although there were suspicions that 
a higher number of about 19,000 unrecorded appointments may have been cancelled altogether. A key 
action that the NHS took in response to this attack was to put in place measures that could help spot 
future threats. Specifically, the NHS signed a security contract with Microsoft to provide them with a 
new Microsoft package. This special package was to ‘enhance security intelligence’ by helping to identify 
new sources of threats early and making it possible to contain malicious attacks so that they do not spread 




‘This new technology will ensure the NHS can use the latest and most resilient software available 
– something the public rightly expects’.  
b) TalkTalk 
Two years earlier, customers of TalkTalk, a UK internet service provider, had their personal data 
compromised following ‘a significant and sustained’ cyber-attack which was carried out on the 
company’s website. Investigations revealed that TalkTalk had not encrypted the stolen data, making it an 
easy target for cyber attackers. The information retrieved from customers included credit card and bank 
account details. As explained by Elizabeth Denham, the Information Commissioner who posed a hefty 
fine of £400, 000 on TalkTalk,  
‘Yes, hacking is wrong, but that is not an excuse for companies to abdicate their security 
obligations. TalkTalk should and could have done more to safeguard its customer information. It 
did not and we have taken action’.  
In response and in what seems to be a demonstration of learning its lessons, TalkTalk hired an 
external, independent party to assess all its processes and security systems to identify areas of 
vulnerabilities and possible sources of future threats. This was to ensure that the organization was not 
leaving any crevices for attackers to poach on their cyber-systems.  
c) Carphone warehouse 
Carphone warehouse, a company that had previously been part of the TalkTalk group, also faced 
a cyber-attack in 2015 where about three million customer and 1000 employee data were stolen. 
According to the Financial Times, the attackers capitalized on an outdated WordPress interface, which 
was still being used by Carphone Warehouse. The UK’s Information Commissioner, Elizabeth Denham 
rebuked this vulnerability the company had opened its customers to, noting that:  
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‘A company as large, well-resourced and established as Carphone Warehouse, should have been 
actively assessing its data security systems and ensuring systems were robust and not vulnerable 
to such attacks’. 
In response, the company sought external cyber expertise to enhance its cyber security and help 
make their systems ready to identify in good time, future attempts of cyber-attacks.  
d) SingHealth 
Elsewhere in Singapore, the country’s largest healthcare provider, SingHealth, was the victim of 
a cyber-attack in 2018. Personal non-medical data, including patient’s names, addresses, birthdates and 
information on identity cards from patients who had visited various health care centers from May 2015 
to July 2016 of 1.5 million, were compromised. A worrying finding that emerged from the investigations 
on this attack related to how staff of the organization had failed to follow up suspicious activities observed 
in the systems. Thus, while SingHealth put in place measures to enhance the monitoring capabilities of 
its IT systems to spot possible threats, there was also an emphasis on the need to couple such scanning 
and monitoring measures with immediate actions to forestall the potential threat.  
e) DarkSeoul 
In March 2013, cyber-attackers used a malware, called DarkSeoul to carry out an attack on the 
South Korean government. Various institutions, including the three largest television stations, a bank, 
ATM machines and mobile payments were affected. Based on previous evidence of cyber-attacks, South 
Korea censured North Korea for this particular attack. Since the attack, cyber-security has become one 
of the core policy areas of the South Korean Government. Media reports suggest that the Government 
has particularly invested in sophisticated monitoring systems to spot future attempts of cyber-crimes. 
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These cases exemplify various organizational attempts to scan and spot cyber threats and attacks. 
Together, they point to some of the early practices which we consider important in building a resilient 
model against cyber-attacks. It is worth noting that all the specific practices outlined here, encrypting 
data, assessing vulnerabilities of cyber systems and putting in place software that helps to detect threats, 
may not be able to avoid attacks. The CEO of the Copeland Council, Ms. Graham, after it had been hit 
by cyber attackers underscored this point, noting that ‘There is no way we could have kept this attack out, 
but had we had great IT investment we probably would have recovered quicker.’ Thus, the examples 
mentioned above should be aimed at identifying threats and possible attacks and containing them, in a 
way that ensures business continuity. To ensure business continuity when a threat or attack is discovered, 
organizations need to neutralizing effects.   
2) Stage 2: Neutralizing threats and attacks 
The second stage focuses on tactical responses adopted by firms when an attack happens, i.e., 
responses at the trans-attack phase, or when a threat is spotted. Organizational scholars have increasingly 
been concerned about cyber-attacks in the wake of increasing technological advancements in data 
collection, data access and technology for illegal access to others’ data. From our findings, it appeared 
that organizational responses to cyber-attacks aimed at recovery was the most crucial to prevent cyber-
attacks from crumbling an organization’s operations. To illustrate the actions entailed in neutralizing 
current and threats, we turn to the following cases: Maersk, Atlanta City Council, Instagram, Uber, Sony 
Pictures, Cathay Pacific, and Careem.  
a) Maersk 
In June 2017, Maersk was one of the victims of a cyber-attack, called Notpetya. This attack was 
carried out by Russia against Ukrainian organizations and organizations with offices in Ukraine. The 
attack, which prevented employees of affected organizations from accessing their data, affected Maersk 
18 
 
Line, APM Terminals and all business units of Maersk. The attackers requested a ransom payment of 
$300 in Bitcoin, which Maersk refused to pay. Management of Maersk, explaining their plans for the 
future, noted that given the sophisticated nature of cyber-attacks, it may not always be possible to 
completely prevent a future attack. They considered that preparing an effective recovery strategy would 
be the most relevant option. One of the most important steps it took when the attack happened was, thus, 
to ensure that it mitigated the consequences of the attack on its operations. To achieve this, information 
on which of its activities were running or closed and at what times (such as loading times in ports and 
booking systems), were shared to all relevant parties. The organization also developed a new makeshift 
booking system to ensure continuous running of essential operations. Finally, according to Sonen Skou, 
Maersk’s CEO, all frontline employees were quickly empowered to respond to customer needs in what 
they considered to be the best possible way, ‘do what you think is right to serve the customer — don’t 
wait for the headquarters, we’ll accept the cost’ [57]. On a more general scope, Maersk reviewed their 
systems to become more resilient by introducing new measures to enhance cyber-security so that in the 
event of a reoccurrence, it would be able to ‘isolate an attack quicker and restore systems quicker’ [57]. 
b) Atlanta City Council 
A year after the Maersk attack, the Atlanta City Council, US, was also affected by a cyber-attack 
that infiltrated the bulk of the municipal’s systems. The attackers demanded a ransom payment of 
approximately $50,000 in bitcoin, which the City Council refused to pay in line with the FBI directives. 
As a result of the attack, about 424 of the City’s software could not operate online. Residents could not 
undertake basic public tasks that relied on the City’s systems, such as paying for parking tickets and 
utility bills. The Council’s first response was to direct all employees to turn off their computers. This 
simple directive was to prevent further spread of the ransomware through its networks. An additional 
emergency measure the Council took to neutralize the attack was to deploy a number of external contracts 
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to offer some of its services that had been affected. Specifically, the Council entered into about ten 
contracts with external agencies and institutions to be able to provide the affected services.  
c) Instagram 
Instagram’s response to a cyber-attack on its systems also offers a demonstration of how 
organizations may neutralize the effects of a cyber-attack. In August 2018, cyber attackers replaced 
Instagram users’ account details, including profile images, handles, contact details and bios, with still 
photos from Disney movies. They also replaced email addresses with ones ending with .ru, a Russian 
domain. While the organization’s investigations found that most of the hacked accounts were not two-
factor secured, it was also found that some users’ who had done two-factor authentication were still 
affected. When Instagram had received information about the attack, they quickly sent out instructions 
to Instagram users and guided them on securing their data. Users were informed to ‘report any unusual 
activity through our reporting tools. You can access those tools by tapping the ‘…’ menu from your 
profile, selecting ‘Report a Problem’ and then ‘Spam or Abuse’. The social media company also 
explained that they had fixed the bug immediately they found out about it and cooperated with law 
enforcement agencies for further investigations. 
d) Uber 
A fourth example of how organizations neutralize such attacks can be seen in the response of Uber, 
a ride-hailing service after it became victim for the second time to cyber-attacks. Hackers broke into 
Uber’s GitHub account and stole information, including names, email addresses, phone numbers and 
drivers’ license numbers, from about 57 million customers and drivers in 2016. According to the CEO, 
the hackers used a third-party cloud-based service to carry out the attack. While legal regulations ban 
cyber victims from paying ransoms to attackers, Uber paid an initial $100,000 to the attackers to destroy 
the data they had stolen. In addition, the CEO claimed that Uber:  
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‘Took immediate steps to secure the data and shut down further unauthorized access by the 
individuals. We also implemented security measures to restrict access to and strengthen controls on 
our cloud-based storage accounts’ (CEO, cited in Newcomer 2017).  
e) Cathay Pacific 
In October 2018, Cathay Pacific was the victim of a cyber-attack that leaked personal information, 
such as names, identity card numbers, passport details, email addresses and credit card details of about 
9.4 million passengers. Even though the attack was spotted during a routine IT operation the organization 
was carrying out, investigations revealed that the data breach had been going on for much longer. Cathay 
Pacific’s focus for the first three months of the attack was directed towards containing it. All affected 
customers were informed of the attack and offered guidance on how to protect themselves, including an 
option for complementary monitoring. A dedicated website was also set up for customers to communicate 
with the organization on their concerns. In a video placed on their website, CEO, Rupert Hogg confirmed 
these strategic activities:  
‘Upon discovery, we acted immediately to contain the event and to thoroughly investigate…We 
engaged one of the world’s leading cybersecurity firms to assist us and we further strengthened our 
IT security systems too’ (Rupert Hogg, CEO, 2018). 
f) Sony pictures 
Sony pictures faced a massive cyber-attack, Wannacry, in October 2014. The attackers accessed and 
shared yet-to-be released movies on illegal sites and stole confidential information belonging to Sony 
Pictures and individual employees, which they then circulated online. Employees could not use their 
computers for more than six weeks after the attack for fear of remnants affecting their online activities. 
One of Sony’s first responses was to provide security and protection to top producers and actors linked 
21 
 
to the movie titled, The Interview. This was in response to threats of physical abuse from the attackers. 
It also offered a year of credit monitoring to current employees. Sony’s legal partners asked all media 
houses to stop further downloading information that had been compromised and also to destroy any data 
they already had in their possession. Using the services of third-party companies, like Entura International 
Limited, Sony Pictures tried to block distribution of the stolen data and to delete all links that lead to the 
hacked information.  
g) Careem 
In 2018, information from about 14 million customers and drivers of Careem, a ride-hailing app, 
operating in countries in the Middle East, were stolen. The affected information included ride histories, 
names, phone numbers, credit card details and email addresses. Careem got to know about the attack 
based on a note the attacker left on their system. According to Forbes Middle East [58], the main impact 
of this attack is the erosion of trust by customers that Careem and all other online based transactions are 
likely to confront. This is especially so because the Middle East is still emerging in the use of online 
transactions and customers may be discouraged on the security of their systems. Careem took immediate 
measures to neutralize the effects of the attack as explained below;  
‘As soon as we detected the breach, we launched a thorough investigation and engaged leading 
cybersecurity experts to assist us in strengthening our security systems. We are also working with 
law enforcement agencies. Throughout the incident, our priority has been to protect the data and 
privacy of our customers and captains. Since discovering the issue, we have worked to understand 
what happened, who was affected and what we needed to do to strengthen our network 
defenses.’ (Careem Official Blog Post, 2018) 
While the first stage of scanning and identifying sources of threats are important, the sentiments 
shared by individuals who have led their organizations through cyber-attacks, demonstrate that such steps 
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are not always sufficient in forestalling attacks. Instead, we observe that it is the second stage, 
characterized by recovery efforts or tactical responses to the attacks that often fortify the victim- 
organizations and make them resilient under the pressure of the effects of the attack.  
3) Stage 3: re-designing, upgrading and updating human, technological and financial resources  
In line with the third stage of our model, organizations usually undertake a more long-term 
approach towards building resilience. This section shares some lessons from organizations that have 
taken a long-term approach in avoiding such attacks. 
a) TalkTalk 
After the 2015 cyber-attack on TalkTalk, the internet provider announced that it had invested 
more in security of its cyber systems for future resilience. In addition, the organization reported that cyber 
security had been integrated into the whole organization, rather than as a separate business function:  
‘Security is discussed at every meeting and is embedded in everything we do with the products 
and the services that we launch and has become part of the day to day discussion…we currently 
have an online training system with all our staff going through training programs making sure 
employees are aware of all the types of security and risk and what we would expect in terms of a 
secure approach…’ (Duncan Gooding, COO, TalkTalk, 2017).  
b) Google China 
Similarly, in 2010, cyber-attackers hacked into Google China’s Office Systems and retrieved 
system codes. According to McAfee, the highly sophisticated attack, ‘Operation Aurora’, used about 12 
different malwares and several levels of encryption to ransack the company’s networks. Further 
investigations by Google revealed that some Gmail accounts had also been compromised, although the 
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attackers seemed to have only gained access to account details, such as email addresses and subject titles, 
rather than content of emails. In response to the attack, the multinational built more efficient 
infrastructure and architecture to enhance security of its systems. Google also initiated a worldwide 
educational campaign for its users, informing them on ways to protect themselves from attacks, through 
for instance, using proper antivirus programs. Most significantly, Google China moved its servers to 
Hong Kong, where there were no internet filtering policies.  
c) SingHealth 
In a recent case, cyber-attackers stole non-medical records of about 1.5 million people from 
SingHealth, the largest health group institution in Singapore. The stolen data included medical details of 
the Prime Minister and some other ministers. In response, the IHiS drew on external expertise to evaluate 
cybersecurity policies, threat management processes, IT system controls and organizational and staff 
capabilities of systems within public health care institutions. Another measure taken was to educate both 
public and private healthcare institutions on ways of protecting themselves against cyber-attacks. 
Regardless of these efforts, the Minister of Health noted that it will be impossible to completely eliminate 
the risk of another cybersecurity attack. As already noted, this is a sentiment that is shared by most 
organizations that have been victims of cyber-attacks. The consensus appears to be that it may be difficult 
to put in place long-term mechanisms to avoid such problems.  
d) Uber 
Uber (described in Stage 2) had planned to massively invest into improving security and 
specifically protecting their systems against further hack attempts. It was expected that about 75 more 
employees would be recruited to support the work of the security team. In addition, the organization 
made significant progress by recruiting a new Chief Security Officer, Joe Sullivan, who was previously 
a federal prosecutor of cyber-crime. Joe Sullivan promised to leverage on technology to improve cyber 
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security as well as security against physical threats, trust and safety of customers. The new CSO, Joe 
Sullivan, also noted plans to monitor the use of data even by employees of Uber across the world in order 
to prevent abuse of customers’ data. As he noted,  
‘Every company is a data company now, no one can be unsophisticated. The challenge is half the 
company needs access to customer data some of the time — it is not just customer support, it is 
marketing, engineers as they iterate, communications when they need to figure out what happened 
in an incident.’ (Joe Sullivan, CSO, Uber, 2015).  
In response to the problem this poses, the organization now runs random data auditing to ensure 
that employees are only accessing data when necessary and for its intended purposes.  
The cases in this stage suggest that as part of building their resilience, organizations often put in 
place long term measures to guide themselves against possible future attacks. The activities at this stage 
are often extremely comprehensive and may require wholly reconfiguring certain organizational 
processes and systems.   
IV. GENERAL DISCUSSION, IMPLICATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS 
We proposed a model of organizational resilience, identifying how organizations can analyze, 
mobilize and revise their processes to become more resilient. We then drew on examples of cases to shed 
light on the specific actions that can be taken in each stage of the model. Although the cases vary in 
internal characteristics, such as in organizational culture, structure and business processes, and external 
characteristics, such as motive behind attacks, there are still significant and clear commonalities in terms 
of responses and resulting lessons for organizations seeking to be resilient in an era of cyber adversities. 
In what follows, and supported by relevant literature, we reiterate the lessons and recommendations from 
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each of the stages, as shown in Table 2. Next, we highlight the contributions of our study to existing 
literature, identify limitations and corresponding directions for future research.  
TABLE II 
RESILIENCE ARCHITECTURE MODEL: FINDINGS AND LESSONS 
 
Focus of resilience 
model  
Resilient practices and suggested responses Relevant studies 
Proactive environmental 
scanning and locating 
potential threats –  
Focus on period before 
an attack or threat is 
discovered 
- Anticipate possibilities for attacks  
- Regularly scan and monitor systems for threats and 
attacks 
- Utilize internal expertise of hire external expertise to 
assess vulnerabilities  
[11], [23], [50] 
Neutralizing threats and 
attacks –  
Focus on period an 
attack or threat is 
discovered. Aimed at 
stopping a threat, 
containing an attack, 
and reducing the effect 
of an attack on the 
organization’s activities  
- Empower frontline employees to respond to customer 
needs 
- Regularly provide information to relevant and key 
stakeholders on measures that need taking (e.g., 
available and unavailable services) 
- Deploy external agencies and partners to offer core 
services  
- Communicate with affected customers on how to secure 
their data and offer incentives to discourage switching 
to unaffected competitors 
- Utilize available expertise to help contain attack and 
curtail distribution of the stolen data 
- Purchase new cyber systems to ensure normal business 
functioning 
- Make insurance claims to cover costs or tap into other 
financial reserves 
[13], [20], [21], [26], 
[31], [45], [50], [59] 
Re-designing, upgrading 
and updating human, 
technological and 
financial resources – 
Focus on putting in 
place ongoing and long-




- Make cyber security efforts integral to all parts of the 
organization 
- Invest in more efficient cyber infrastructure  
- Conduct regular auditing of cyber systems and where 
needed, hire external to help regularly evaluate cyber 
systems  
- Train all employees to be clear on roles and 
responsibilities in managing cyber security 
- Have favorable insurance policies in place  
- Ensure regular upgrading of financial reserves 
- Encourage flexible and viable business models 
[21], [26], [31], [36], 
[41], [42], [45], [46] 
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A)  Key lessons and recommendations for organizations 
1)  Stage 1 
In an environment rife with uncertainty, organizations need to proactively scan their environment 
for threats and where possible, translate them into strategic flexibilities. At the scanning and spotting 
stage of the resilient model, organizations undertake deliberate actions to detect threats [60]. This is 
important to reduce blind spots and ensure relevant latent resources are activated to respond effectively 
to attacks [11], [20]. As the illustrations from our cases suggest, attacks sometimes festered and caused 
damage in organizations’ systems for as long as two years, without victims’ awareness. Thus, a common 
concern that organizations have is how to assess cyber systems to spot looming threats or attacks quickly. 
An important practice is for managers to ensure that regular and routine checks are conducted to identify 
any discrepancies in systems’ operations. As the examples from NHS and SingHealth show, 
organizations may benefit from updated cyber interfaces and personalized software that automatically 
scans threats in cyber systems. However, as demonstrated in the case of the apathetic employees in 
SingHealth, it is not enough to scan and spot suspicious activities. Employees also need to be sensitized 
to respond or report such activities immediately upon discovery. Scanning could also be aimed at 
evaluating cyber systems for vulnerabilities [26]. Where such vulnerabilities or weaknesses, rather than 
threats or attacks are spotted, organizations need relevant expertise to advice on ways of securing systems 
and avoiding an attack. As Crichton et al. [23] advice, however, organizations should be aware of such 
‘preparedness’ giving a false sense of security, which often leads to disregarding other relevant actions. 
The resulting complacency often leads to devastating outcomes when an adversity happens.  
2)  Stage 2 
When an attack or threat has been spotted, relevant responses should immediately be activated to 
contain complications and neutralize effects on business operations [60]. These responses are tactical in 
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nature and are the most important for surviving through attacks. The aim here, in line with expectations 
of resilient organizations is to persevere through the attack and ensure business continuity [16], [20]. At 
this stage, a number of practices and responses suggested in the resilient literature and demonstrated by 
our case examples are essential. (1) There is an indisputable need to work closely with security agencies 
and where available, government offices in charge of cybersecurity, such as the UK’s National Cyber 
Security Centre. (2) Organizations will need to tap into resources of external networks and alliances [44], 
[59]. This is especially vital when they need to hire temporary workers or expertise to help in recovery 
processes or to maintain delivery of essential services, in times when cyber-attacks leave their systems 
inoperable. The responses from Copeland Council and the City of Atlanta illustrate how external agencies 
and expertise could be useful for ensuring business continuity at this stage. (3) A third important response 
at this stage is dissuading customers, especially where they have been directly affected by an attack, from 
switching to competitors. In the first attack against TalkTalk, thousands of customers immediately 
switched to other internet service providers. To reduce similar incidents, the neutralizing stage requires 
resilient organizations to aggressively seek to maintain their customer base. As demonstrated in our cases, 
Anthem Insurers offered two years of credit monitoring, while BA offered financial compensation for 
customers whose accounts had been affected. (4) A fourth crucial practice that can make organizations 
resilient during attacks is to constantly communicate updates to affected parties in a professional manner, 
as demonstrated by most of the twenty-one cases. The communication needs to be clear, accessible, 
relevant and reasonably regular. In relation to this, frontline employees should be empowered to offer 
relevant solutions and responses to customers.  (5) Furthermore, organizations also need to create robust 
back-up systems that enable them to recover loss data and switch to different systems that enable them 
to continue to maintain momentum or function to successfully neutralize the effects of an attack. (6) 
Finally, organizations should be ready to invest in new systems to ensure ongoing delivery of services, 
such as in the case of Maersk for example, where the organization urgently installed 4,000 new servers, 
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45,000 new PCs and 2,500 applications. To defray these costs, organizations may benefit from tapping 
into favorable insurance packages [35], [53] as demonstrated in how Equifax planned to handle its costs. 
3) Stage 3 
At the third stage of the resilient model, organizational responses are more strategic in nature and 
aimed at making resilience to cyber-attacks an integral part of the day to day activities of the organization 
for long term benefits [31]. As the CEO of TalkTalk explained, one of the responses the organization has 
taken to become more resilient against cyber-attacks is by regularly discussing cyber security issues at 
meetings and embedding security practices in all processes relating to products and services. A barrier to 
reducing the impact of attacks is the lack of dedicated resources to identify and respond to weakness in 
organizations’ systems. This also affects the post-attack phase and ability of firms to benefit from the 
recovery strategies outlined in Stage 2. To address this, investment in human resources and empowering 
them to mobilize and implement relevant expertise is again, crucial [36], [46]. (1) There is a need to 
expand employees’ consideration of threats to include cyber threats as an evolving and re-occurring 
danger to businesses. In this regard, many of our case organizations had indicated skills upgrading as an 
essential means of developing strategic flexibility. Financial and non-financial reward systems may be 
instituted for tech-savvy individuals to report new threats and weaknesses in systems. (2) In addition, 
organizations need to be deliberate at investing financial resources and updating technological resources 
specifically for the purposes of managing cyber threats. According to [45], having financial reserves 
prevents layoffs, and in turn helps sustain strong social bonds within the organization which is crucial 
for persevering through crises. Cyber insurance policies can also be an important strategic response to 
fund responses. (3) Finally, flexibility in business models is crucial to enable organizations adapt routines 
and processes in response to vulnerabilities and attacks [41], while viable business models (e.g. ensuring 
low cost of operations), can help save towards adversities [45].  
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It is worth noting that the three stages of resilience are neither mutually exclusive nor strictly 
linearly progressive. For instance, organizations need not have been attacked to start updating or re-
designing their human, financial and technological resources. In fact, attention paid to effective strategic 
measures, outlined at the third stage, will ensure quick recovery when responses relevant for neutralizing 
the effects of an attack are activated during an attack. In addition, certain actions and responses are 
important across all stages of the model, even though we found that they were commonly present in 
specific stages of the organizations’ studied responses. For instance, scanning cyber systems for threats 
and attacks could still be important even when an attack has happened. This is because cyber systems 
become particularly vulnerable in the midst of ongoing attacks and an easy target for cyber criminals to 
infiltrate other parts of an organizations systems.   
How do organizations incorporate these lessons into achieving an effective architecture for 
resilience against cyber-attacks? On a broader level, organizations must ensure that their processes, 
people, culture and strategies are creatively aligned to support relevant responses and actions highlighted 
in the three stages. Importantly, and based on existing studies and our findings, we suggest that the 
architecture is 1) flexible and innovative to accommodate changes, 2) regularly evaluated to update 
processes and practices in response to feedback from various stages of the model, and 3) integral across 
all facets of the organization. These, while uncomfortable and costly for some organizations, are essential 
to reduce the extent to which threats or attacks from cyber criminals that impact on business goals. 
Fortunately, when well-integrated to all functions of the organization, the benefits of resilience go beyond 
making organizations robust against cyber-attacks. Such an architecture could also be an effective source 
of competitive advantage. In addition, organizations differ in organizational structure and business 
processes. Thus, although, it was not the focus of this study to offer micro perspectives regarding the 
moderation effects of organization characteristics on the strategic implementations of the three stages, 
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managers are encouraged to carefully evaluate and take these differences into account in strategic 
planning.   
B)  Contributions, limitations, and suggestions for future studies  
In addition to the practical relevance of our paper for practicing managers, our research also 
contributes to the literature on cyber-attacks and resilience. First, in direct response to contextual gaps 
spotted in a recent review of influential studies on resilience management [20], our paper integrates 
insights on resilience from different domains and apply them to the unique context of adversities linked 
to cyber systems. In particular, our cross-sector cases have provided new insights into the previous unseen 
‘methods’ [21] of how resilience against cyber-attacks happens in organizations. Second and relatedly, 
by situating our study in the complex and unpredictable context of cyber-attacks where complete 
avoidance of an attack through traditional risk assessments is near impossible [21], this study confirms 
the need for definitions that recognize context specific strengths and emergent meanings of resilience 
[20]. Specifically, the ways in which our case organizations demonstrated resilience through ensuring 
business continuity through attacks offers support to definitions of resilience as robustness and 
perseverance through adversities [22], rather than complete avoidance.  
Given the dearth of knowledge on practical responses resilient organizations undertake in 
responding to cyber-attacks, we have focused here on cyber-attacks. However, our model also seems to 
be of broad relevance to organizations seeking to develop resilience against other forms of environmental 
upheavals. This is because in articulating practices relevant for our model through the cases, we 
emphasized soft managerial skills, such as dissuading customers from switching during a crisis, and other 
considerations that resonate with the day-to-day running of organizations peculiar to contemporary 
business environments. All of these are accessible and practically relevant to managers whose 
organizations are faced with various adverse situations. Our study has, thus, progressed some way 
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towards responding to a key research question in a review by Linnenluecke [20, p23] on ‘how findings 
from discrete case examples could be integrated to develop insights that are more generalizable to 
different settings and contexts’.  
Despite the insights from our study, it is not without limitations. First, as a result of relying on 
commentaries on how organizations have responded to cyber-attacks from affected organizations’ own 
websites, PR outlets as well as press information, there are possibilities for bias in some of the information 
available. It is, for instance, possible for some of these responses to have been framed by organizations 
to appease affected audience and protect organizational reputation, while withholding actual ways in 
which they responded [61]. We have, where possible, relied on more than one source of information for 
the cases as an attempt to reduce such incidents of strategic framing. For future research, data collected 
through direct interviews and surveys with multiple parties involved or affected could be useful. Second, 
while our lessons may be useful for organizations of different sizes, we believe that further studies 
focusing on smaller businesses can add new insights to some of the lessons enumerated here. This is 
because, the unique behavioral tendencies and resource constraints of small businesses may necessitate 
different responses to the ones the mainly large organizations illustrated in our study adopted. An 
insightful finding relates to how relationships with external parties can be an important avenue to 
persevere through cyber adversities. Going forward with research in the area, it will be interesting to 
examine the value of political ties and pressure groups in combatting these attacks. This is particularly 
important as cyber-attackers seem to, themselves, be often motivated by political ambitions, such as in 
the suspected cases of ‘Lazarus’, a North Korean Government group’s attack against Sony Pictures, the 
Chinese Government against Google’s China platform to stall human right actions, and Russian agents 
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In 2010, cyber-attackers hacked into Google 
China’s Office Systems and retrieved 
Google’s system codes. According to 
McAfee, the attackers used about 12 
different malwares and several levels of 
encryption to ransack the company’s 
networks. Further investigations revealed 
that some Gmail accounts had also been 
compromised. Google suspected that the 
Chinese government was behind the attack 
as part of its attempt to monitor 
conversations of human rights activists.  
While its aims were unsuccessful, the attack led to 
a hostile relationship between Google and China 
with the multinational refusing to censor its reports 
according to Chinese guidelines. Google noted 
after the attack that  
 
TR:  In March 2010, Google relocated its google.cn servers to 
Hong Kong in order to escape China’s Internet filtering policy. 
SR: In response to the attack, the multinational built more 
efficient infrastructure and architecture to enhance security of its 
systems. Google also initiated a worldwide educational 
campaign for its users, informing them on ways to protect 
themselves from attacks, through for instance, using proper 
antivirus programs.   
Step 2, 
Step 3 
Maersk  In June 2017 cyber-attackers prevented 
Maersk employees from accessing their 
data, unless they made a ransom payment of 
$300 in Bitcoin. The attack affected Maersk 
Line, APM Terminals and Damco, all 
business units of Maersk. Researchers 
suspected that the attack was led by Russia’s 
against Ukranian Organisations.  
The attack led the organisations’ container ships 
and all 76 of its port terminals to cease operations 
and resulted in a decline of 250 million to 300 
million in profits. 
 
‘It was frankly quite a shocking experience…Your 
email goes down, all your address system. We 
ended up having to use WhatsApp on our private 
phones’. (Seron Skuo, 2017. Quoted from FT).  
TR: According to Møller-Maersk chair, Jim Hagemann Snabe, 
Notpetya’s destructiveness required an urgent installation of 
4000 new servers, 45,000 new PCs and 2,500 applications.  
SR:  According to the CEO, it is not possible to completely 
prevent a future attack. 
Notwithstanding, the organisation reviewed its systems to 
become more resilient by introducing new measures for the 
future in order to ‘isolate an attack quicker and restore systems 
quicker’.  
According to Maersk (2017), ‘In response to this new type of 
malware, we have put in place different and further protective 
measures’.  
Step 1,  




Sony pictures faced a massive cyber-attack, 
Wannacry, in October 2014. The attackers 
accessed and shared yet-to-be released 
movies on illegal sites and stole confidential 
information belonging to Sony Pictures and 
individual employees, which they then 
circulated online.  
Investigations reveal that Lazarus, a group 
with links to the North Korean Government 
may have been behind the attacks with the 
aim of stopping Sony Pictures from airing 
‘The Interview’, a satirical comedy movie 
around an assassination plot of the North 
Korean leader.  
 
 
Employees could not use their computers for more 
than six weeks after the attack for fear of remnants 
of the attack.  
Various confidential information belonging to 
Sony Pictures and individual employees were 
made public.  
Employees of Sony levelled about seven class 
action lawsuits against their employer for not 
taking strict steps to protect their confidential 
information.  
Theatres were unable to show ‘The Interview’ on 
scheduled dates due to threats from the attackers 
made terrorist threats against cinemas showing the 
film. 
TR: Sony provided security and protection to top producers and 
actors linked to the movie, The Interview. It also offered a year 
of credit monitoring to current employees. 
Sony’s legal partners asked all media houses to stop downloading 
information that had been compromised and also demanded that 
they destroy any data they already had in their possession.   
Using the services of third-party companies, like Entura 
International, Sony Pictures tried to block distribution of the 
stolen data and to delete all links that led to the hacked 
information.  
SR: At the national level, the United States Government issued 
a legislative proposal to update and establish new laws that 
empowered the country to prosecute crimes related to 
cybercrime and at the same time uphold the privacy of 
Americans.  
 






Company   
The company was the victim of a cyber-
attack in June 2018, in which confidential 
information of top clients were retrieved.  
The company only got to know of the attack 
when the attackers informed it that it had 
Liberty Holdings’ Shares fell by nearly 5% after 




TR: Relevant authorities in South Africa, as well as clients were 
informed of the attack.  
There was an immediate investigation into Liberty Holding’s 
Systems to identify vulnerable aspects of the IT Infrastructure 
Systems. The organisation then secured computer systems  
Step 2,  
Step 3 
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accessed and retrieved data, which will be 
shared with the public if they were not 
compensated. The Insurer, however, did not 
make this payment.    
SR: According to the Insurer, measures have been put in place 
to secure computer systems and ensure that individual 
information is protected. The details of these are not yet publicly 
available.  
NHS, England  In 2017, NHS, England faced one of its 
greatest cyber-attacks in recent times. The 
attack, WannaCry, encrypted data on 
infected computers and made it impossible 
for users to access their files. The attackers, 
Shadow Brokers, suspected to be linked to 
Russia, then demanded a ransom, which the 
NHS refused to honour in line with legal 
requirements.   
According to the Telegraph, this attack 
successfully executed when emails sent by 
the attackers are mistakenly opened on any 
of their target’s computers, leading to 
phishing. Once the attackers have access to 
the target’s systems, they make it impossible 
for users to access any files.  
 
 
34% of NHS Trusts worldwide faced severe 
disruptions to services. 6, 912 appointments were 
cancelled although there were expectations that a 
higher number of about 19000 unrecorded 
appointments may have been cancelled altogether. 
Huge costs in the form of cancelled appointments, 
restoration of data systems and additional support 
from local NHS bodies were incurred. 
 
TR: Patients from some Trusts, including London, Essex, 
Hertfordshire, Hampshire and Cumbria were transferred to other 
Accident and Emergency departments, while two other Trusts 
were reinforced with external support.  
A cyber security researcher’s work helped to recover systems 
and stop the spread of the malware. 
SR: NHS England and NHS Improvement announced to all 
major health institutions instructing them to implement all alerts 
issued by NHS Digital between March and May 2017. They 
were also asked to ensure that all local firewalls have been 
secured.  
NHS England also drew a contract with Microsoft, to provide a 
new package that would help identify threats early and contain 
malicious attacks without spreading to other places. According 
to the Health Secretary,  
‘We have been building the capability of NHS systems over a 
number of years, but there is always more to do to future-proof 
our NHS against this threat…This new technology will ensure 
the NHS can use the latest and most resilient software available 
– something the public rightly expect’ (Jeremy Hunt, Health 
Secretary). 
In addition, all healthcare organizations have now been required 
to meet 10 standards set for data security and protection toolkit. 
Lord O’Shaughnessy (2018), a health minister, said in light of 
this: ‘Patient data must be properly protected and this significant 
investment will help to keep our systems resilient and up to 
date’.  
Step 1, 





Provider, UK  
 
 
In 2015, over 150 000 of TalkTalk’s 
customers’ data were compromised when ‘a 
significant and sustained’ cyber-attack was 
carried out on its website. Investigations on 
the attack revealed that the stolen data had 
not been encrypted, making it an easy target 
for the attackers. The information retrieved 
from customers included credit card and 
bank account details. In November 2018, 
two young men, Matthew Henley and 
Connor Allsop both from Tamworth, 
England, were jailed for their involvement in 
the attack. 
As a result of the attack, 101000 customers 
switched from TalkTalk to other service providers.  
Numbers of new customers dropped significantly 
and online sales operations reduced to the barest 
minimum. 
The company was also fined £400,000 by the 
Information Commissioners’ Office for not taking 
basic steps to prevent the attack.  
 
 
TR: TalkTalk offered free upgrades to customers to discourage 
them from switching to competitors. 
They also invited an independent, external party be to assess all 
its processes and security systems in order to identify areas of 
vulnerabilities. 
SR: TalkTalk announced that it had invested more in security of 
its cyber systems. In addition, the organisation reported that 
cyber security had been integrated into the whole organization, 
rather than as a separate business function.  
‘Security is discussed at every meeting and is embedded in 
everything we do with the products and the services that we 
launch and has become part of the day to day discussion…we 
currently have an online training system with all our staff going 
through training programmes making sure employees are aware 
of all the types of security and risk and what we would expect in 
terms of a secure approach…’ (Duncan Gooding, COO, 
TalkTalk). 
Step 1,  
Step 2,  
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However, quite recently in March 2018, Sky news reported a 
warning from an attacker who pointed out key vulnerabilities in 
TalkTalk’s website, which seems to question the effectiveness 
of the strategies the organization has put in place since the attack.  
Carphone 
Warehouse  
In 2015, cyber-attackers targeted Carphone 
Warehouse, stealing data from about three 
million customers and 1000 employees. The 
company’s onestopphoneshop.com, 
e2save.com and mobiles.co.uk websites 
were the business units affected in the attack. 
According to the Financial Times, the 
attackers capitalized on an outdated 
WordPress interface, which was still being 
used at Carphone Warehouse.   
5.9 million payment card details and 1.2 million 
personal data records including names, addresses 
and email details were stolen. This meant that 
affected customers and employees were 
vulnerable to possible fraud.  
Carphone was fined an amount of £400, 000 by the 
Information Commissioners Office and shares fell 
about 6.4%. ICO fined Carphone for failing in its 
duty to carry out measures that would protect the 
security of stakeholders online.  
According to the UK Information Commissioner, 
Elizabeth Denham, said, ‘A company as large, 
well-resourced and established as Carphone 
Warehouse, should have been actively assessing 
its data security systems and ensuring systems 
were robust and not vulnerable to such attacks.’ 
TR: The company informed all affected people, relevant card 
companies and national security agencies of the attack.  
SR: The company said it had invited cyber experts and enhanced 
its security to fight against future attempts. 




Anthem was affected by a cyber-attack in 
2015 that leaked personal information of 
about 75 million customers, employees and 
the CEO, Joseph R. Swedish. The attacker 
seemed to have gained access to and 
retrieved data relating to names, date of 
births, addresses and social security 
numbers. The organisation’s investigations 
revealed that data had been stolen for some 
weeks before it was discovered.  
The organization was charged a total amount of 
$115 million for exposing peoples’ data. Stolen 
data could lead to irreparable problems, such as 
identity theft.  
TR: The company offered two years-worth of credit monitoring 
to its customers and advised them to monitor their accounts.  
The Cyber Security firm, Mandiant, also assessed and evaluated 
all their security systems.  
In addition to these, the company contacted relevant law 




Co, U.S. Drug 
maker 
In 2017, Merck was one of the victims of the 
Notpeya cyber-attack. Notpeyers affected 
organizations which did not have a security 
patch in its Microsoft Systems. The attack 
affected three units: operations, 
manufacturing, research and sales, 
significantly disrupting operations in these 
areas.  Employees found a ransomware 
message on their computers. According to 
an anonymised employee report on the 
Wasington Post:  
‘Some people looked like they had their 
hardware wiped — it just shut down the 
whole network site,’ 
It took at least six months to restore most systems.  
There were severe disruptions on global 
operations and new drugs could not be produced.  
Merck had to rely on the US government for 
certain supplies in order to meet demand.  
In addition, the attack led to a loss of $260 million 
in sales and had to use $360 for additional 
marketing of its products.  
TR: Employees were officially informed of the attack through a 
public address system. Due to the inaccessibility of computer 
systems, they were also asked to call a number, which is often 
used during severe weather emergencies to check if they had to 





In October 2018, Cathay Pacific was the 
victim of a cyber-attack that leaked personal 
information, such as names, identity card 
numbers, passport details, email addresses 
There was a significant drop in shares, with a 
decline of $ 201 million in market value. 
Customer data were exposed, although it appears 
no fraud activities had been carried out.  
 
TR: The focus of the first three months of the attack was an 
attempt to contain the attack.  
All affected customers were informed and offered guidance on 
how to protect themselves, including an option for 
complementary monitoring for all passengers. A dedicated 
Step 1,  
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and credit card details of about 9.4 million 
passengers.  
The attack was spotted during an IT 
operation the organisation was carrying out. 
However, it appears the breach had been 
going on for much longer. According to 
Cathay Pacific, even during the period after 
they had first spotted the attack and started 
making attempts to investigate and stop it 
spreading, they continued to be attacked for 
over 3 months, between March and May.   
website was also set up for customers to communicate with the 
organisation on their concerns.  
In addition, they informed relevant security agencies and started 
an investigation into the attack.  
The Airline also said that it had spent over $128 million on IT 
systems and security in the 3 years leading to the attack and 
would continue to do so.  
In a video placed on their website, CEO, Rupert Bogg confirmed 
these strategic activities  
‘Upon discovery, we acted immediately to contain the event and 
to thoroughly investigate,’ Hogg said. ‘We engaged one of the 
world’s leading cybersecurity firms to assist us and we further 
strengthened our IT security systems too.’ (CEO Rupert Bogg.’ 
Singapore 
Health Sector  
In 2018, Singapore’s largest healthcare 
provider, SingHealth, was attacked by 
cyber-security experts. According to the 
government, the attack was led by an 
‘Advanced Persistent Threat’ group, which 
is often linked to a state. The attack leaked 
information of 1.5 million patients, 
including information on the President. The 
aim of the attack was unclear. According to 
the Prime Minister, Lee Hsien Loong,   
‘I don't know what the attackers were hoping 
to find. Perhaps they were hunting for some 
dark state secret, or at least something to 
embarrass me (The Telegraph, 2018)’  
  
Personal non-medical data of 1.5 million patients 
were compromised. This included patient’s names, 
addresses birthdates and information on identity 
cards were accessed and retrieved by the attackers 
from patients who visited various health care 
centres from May, 2015 to July, 2016.    
 
TR: All patients were contacted and informed about the data 
breach and specifically whether their data had been affected.  
SR: Measures were taken to improve security of IT systems. This 
included Internet Separation policies. In addition, more controls 
were introduced. All user and system account were reset, while 
more measures were put in place to enhance monitoring.  
Drawing on external expertise, the IHiS also assessed the public 
healthcare systems to evaluate cybersecurity policies, threat 
management processes, IT system controls and organisational 
and staff capabilities. Another measure taken was to educate 
both public and private healthcare institutions on ways of 
protecting themselves against cyber-attacks. Regardless of these 
efforts, the Minister of Health noted that attackers seemed to be 
a step ahead of techniques of destruction.  
‘We will do our utmost to secure our IT systems. However, 
unfortunately, we cannot completely eliminate the risk of 
another cybersecurity attack,’  
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In 2017, the parent company of Equifax, 
located in US faced a cyber-attack. This 
affected a file containing 15.2 million UK 
records stored between 2011 and 2016. The 
file contained data on customers, as well as 
duplicates of data for trials.  
The effects of the attack on customers were 
classified into four categories. The first group of 
costumers had the emails linked to their Equifax 
accounts accessed. The second group had log in 
details of their Equifax account, including names, 
passwords, secret question and answers. The third 
category of customers had their driving licence 
number accessed. The fourth group had their 
phone number accessed.   
The organisation was fined an amount of £500,000 
for failing to protect customers’ interests. 
According to The Information Commissioner’s 
Office (ICO), this was because of vulnerabilities in 
Aquifax’ system which prevented them from 
engaging. 
‘The Information Commissioner's Office (ICO) 
found that Equifax's systems to manage the 
personal information were inadequate and 
ineffective, while investigators found significant 
TR: All affected customers were contacted and informed of the 
level of damage or category of risk they fell into.  They were also 
informed of free ID protection offered by Equifax. 
In terms of costs, Equifax recently reported that it had USD 125 
million of cyber security insurance, which it would use to defray 
some of the cost of the attack.   
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42 
Organization Nature of cyber-attacks in brief Effects of the attacks Organizational responses: Tactical response (TR) and 




problems with data retention, IT system patching 
and audit procedures’. 
Reuters (2017) estimated a cost of about $600 
million which the company spent on legal fees, 
free protection form identity theft for customers 
and upgrades to technology and security systems.  
British 
Airways  
In August 2018, British Airways was the 
target of a cyber-attack, where customers 
who had booked a flight between August 21st 
and 5th September had their personal data 
accessed. According to Sky news reports, 
The number of customers in this bracket 
were about 400, 000. According to BA’s 
chairman, Alex Cruz, while the hackers did 
not access any encrypted data, they used 
illicit ways to access the organizations 
website and retrieve customers’ bank details 
used to make flight payments.   
Many customers had to cancel their credit cards 
and request replacement cards. This was to prevent 
the hackers from using the information they had 
collected, which included card details, from 
making payments.  
Based on new penalties under the GDPR 
regulations, BA is expected to be fined about £500 
million. 
TR: After BA realised the data breach, they informed all affected 
customers. The organisation also promised financial 
compensation for any customers who had incurred any financial 





Hackers broke into Uber’s GitHub account 
and stole information, relating to names, 
email addresses, phone numbers and drivers’ 
license numbers, from about 57 million 
customers and drivers in 2016. According to 
the CEO, the hackers used a third part cloud-
based service to carry out the attack. The 
organisation was criticised for not disclosing 
the attack for almost a year after it happened. 
Instead, it paid hackers $100,000 to destroy 
all data they had accessed. 
 
Aside the customer and drivers’ data that were 
compromised, Uber also came up wide criticisms 
provoked by a Blomberg report, which rebuked the 
organisation for refusing to disclose the attack.  
The Chief Security Officer and some of his 
subordinates who led decisions to be silent on the 
attack were sacked from the organisation. 
Uber faced a number of lawsuits from state and 
local governments for trying to conceal legal 
information and not protecting customer data.  
TR: Uber paid an initial $100,000 to the attackers to destroy the 
data they had stolen. This was against regulations that all data 
breaches be reported to law enforcement agencies and to avoid 
paying ransom to hackers.   
In response to the attack in particular, the CEO claimed that it 
‘took immediate steps to secure the data and shut down further 
unauthorized access by the individuals. We also implemented 
security measures to restrict access to and strengthen controls on 
our cloud-based storage accounts,’  
SR: As at 2017, Uber had planned to invest in drastically 
improving security and specifically protecting their systems 
against further hack attempts. It was expected that about 75 more 
employees would be recruited to support the work of the security 
team.  
In addition, the organisation made significant progress by 
recruiting a new Chief Security Officer, Joe Sullivan, who was 
previously a federal prosecutor of cyber-crime. He promised to 
leverage on technology to improve cyber security as well as 
security against physical threats, trust and safety of customers.  
The new CSO also noted plans to monitor the use of data even 
by employees of Uber across the world in order to prevent abuse 
of customers’ data. As he noted, ‘Every company is a data 
company now, no one can be unsophisticated. The challenge is 
half the company needs access to customer data some of the time 
— it is not just customer support, it is marketing, engineers as 
they iterate, communications when they need to figure out what 
happened in an incident’. In response to the problem this poses, 
the organisation now runs random data auditing to ensure that 
employees are only accessing data when necessary and for its 
intended purposes.   
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Hotel Chain  
In November 2018, Marriott Hotel reported 
that data of about 500 million customers who 
had used its Starwood Hotels, had been 
unlawfully accessed by cyber attackers. The 
attackers hacked into Starwood’s Room 
Reservations Network, used by Sheraton and 
retrieved customers’ home addresses, 
emails, credit card details, dates of birth and 
passport details. According to the 
Multinational, although its internal security 
tool had only spotted the attack in September 
2018, it appears to have been going on for 
four years, making it not only the second 
largest attack in terms of number of 
customers affected, but also one of the most 
persistent attacks on a single organisation in 
recent times. According to cyber security 
experts, Marriott may have become 
vulnerable after it acquired Starwood Hotels 
in 2016, given that the latter was already 
experiencing hacks in its system.  
 
Investigations suggest that Chinese Hackers 
may be behind the attack. 
 
 
Marriott was faced with severe backlash from 
customers who complained that Marriott had 
delayed informing them about the breach, leaving 
them to find out about it in media reports.  
 
The immediate effect on Marriott Hotel was a drop 
in share price by 5% the next morning after the 
announcement of the attack.  
 
While still ongoing, it is expected that the 
organisation will pay a colossal sum of money in 
legal fees.  
TR: In line with legal requirements, Marriott reported the attack 
to UK’S Information Commissioners’ Office (ICO), who noted 
that they had started investigations into the breach Marriott also 
set up a website where they provided customers guidance on 
what they could do if they had been affected 
(info.starwoodhotels.com) (and put up call centers to 
specifically respond to customers whose data had been 
compromised. 
They also tried removing all traces of encrypted information that 
the attackers had done.  
In addition to these, Marriott provided customers in three 
regions, UK, Canada and US a year-long subscription to 
Webwatcher, which helps to detect frauds.  
SR: On their website, Marriott noted the following as steps they 
were taking to reduce possibilities of future recurrence 
1. Engaging leading security experts to help determine 
what occurred.  
2. Installed additional security tools to help gather facts  
3. Leveraged both internal and external security teams to 
work nonstop in investigating the incident 
On a general level, they reported that  
‘We are supporting the efforts of law enforcement and working 
with leading security experts to improve. Marriott is also 
devoting the resources necessary to phase out Starwood systems 
and accelerate the ongoing security enhancements to our 
network’. 






In August 2018, Instagram users had their 
account details, including profile images, 
handles, contact details and bios had been 
changed. The attackers replaced all profile 
photos with still photos from Disney movies 
and replaced email addresses with ones 
ending with .ru, a Russian domain. While the 
organisation’s investigations found that 
most of the hacked accounts were not two-
factor secured, it was also found that some 
users’ who had done the two-factor 
authentication were still affected.   
A number of uses reported not being able to access 
their accounts.  
 
Private data of celebrities and ordinary users were 
stolen. In fact, the hackers sent a sample of stolen 
data to the Daily Beast, perhaps, as prove of their 
attack.  
TR: A number of instructions were sent out to Instagram users 
to guide them on securing their data against attacks. This 
included directions to develop stronger and more secure 
passwords and to ensure that they did a two-factor 
authentication. 
Users were also informed to ‘report any unusual activity through 
our reporting tools.  
According to Instagram, they also fixed the bug immediately 









Information from about 14 million 
customers and drivers of Careem across 13 
countries were stolen. This included ride 
histories, names, phone numbers, credit card 
details and email addresses. Careem got to 
know about the attack based on a note the 
attacker left on their system.  
 
In an apology email to customers, the 
company said ‘We regularly review and 
update our security systems – this time it 
According to Forbes (2018), the main impact of 
this attack is the erosion of trust by customers that 
Careem and all other online based transactions are 
likely to confront. This is especially so because the 
Middle East is still emerging in the use of online 
transactions and customers may be discouraged on 
the security of their systems.  
TR: The organisation informed law enforcement agencies of the 
attack and worked with Interpol to investigate the incident.  
SR: The company has since the attack reported huge investments 
into cybersecurity, including hiring the expertise of leading 
cyber security personnel. 
‘As soon as we detected the breach, we launched a thorough 
investigation and engaged leading cybersecurity experts to assist 
us in strengthening our security systems. We are also working 
with law enforcement agencies. Throughout the incident, our 
priority has been to protect the data and privacy of our customers 
and captains. Since discovering the issue, we have worked to 
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wasn’t enough to prevent an attack,’ 
(Careem Official Blog, 2018). 
understand what happened, who was affected and what we 
needed to do to strengthen our network defences,’ (Careem 
Official Blog Post, 2018) 




In August 2017, the Copeland Council was 
the victim of a cyber-attack, which cost the 
government organization about 2 million 
pounds. According to reports, core services 
of the council, including pay rolling, 
planning and environmental health, had to 
be stalled. While no sensitive data was 
stolen, the attackers demanded ransoms, in 
the form of Bitcoins or refuse access to the 
organizations’ files.  
The attack cost the organization about 2m pounds.  
Employees lost substantial data running into 
several years’ worth of work. It slowed down key 
activities given that basic IT functions including 
printing and accessing files were not available. 
Most of the problems were not resolved for at least 
10 weeks after the attack.   
 
Describing the effect of the attack, the council 
explained on the Local Government Webpage how 
‘no-one in Copeland had any access to any files or 
systems that were saved on shared or personal 
drives. The only accessible files were those stored 
on individual devices and those saved on 
Microsoft OneDrive’ (Local Government 
Association, 2018). 
This meant that the payroll department for instance 
could not generate financial systems at all.  
TR: An IT team was set up, led by the organization’s IT 
Manager. The team also included experts from neighboring 
organizations and partners as well as the cyber security sector. 
The police cyber-crime unit and Information Commissioners’ 
Office were informed.   
 SR: Copeland Council has invested efforts in enhancing its 
resilience against cyber-attacks. This includes running a 
comprehensive health check for its cyber systems and carried out 
extensive cyber training for all staff and members.  
Teams now rely on cloud storage to prevent sudden loss or 
access problems caused by potential future attacks.  
In addition, the council has purchased more updated IT 
equipment and restructured the internal networks to create a sort 
of protection from the effects of future attacks. In addition, roles 
and responsibilities were redesigned to enhance accountability.  
As explained by the CEO of the council, Ms Graham ‘There is 
no way we could have kept this attack out, but had we had great 
IT investment we probably would have recovered quicker.’ 
Step 2, 
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South Korea In March 2013, cyber attackers used a 
malware called DarkSeoul, to carry out 
attacks against various institutions and 
online systems in South Korea including the 
three largest television stations, a bank, 
ATM machines and mobile payments. Based 
on previous evidence of attacks by North 
Korea, South Korea blamed this particular 
attack on North Korea.  
 
A large number of banking files went missing. 
Some internet banking services became 
completely unresponsive and computer systems of 
the television stations stopped working.  
TR: A security alert was raised by the military. In addition, the 
Korea Communications Commission asked government 
agencies and businesses to increase the possible number of 
monitors to guard against any potential attacks.   
SR: Since the attack, cyber-security has become one of the core 
policy areas of the South Korean Government. They have 
particularly invested in sophisticated ways of monitoring 
systems to spot any prevent future attempts of cyber-crimes. 




Email addresses of about 13,000 people in 
Edinburg were stolen in an attack that 
affected the Council’s systems. According to 
investigations, this happened when their 
website service provider’s systems were 
hacked by cyber-attackers.  
 
In a report by the Council, the email addresses, 
which were stolen were noted to have led to loss 
of data integrity, abuse of confidentiality and a 
poor reputation  
TR: The Council informed all affected clients of the attack and 
asked them to change existing passwords they had previously 
used to access the council’s web services.  
They also provided a number and website where all who had 
been affected could share their concerns.  
The UK Information Commission, as well as the Government’s 
Computer Emergency Support Team were informed. 
SR: In the 2016 Audited Annual Accounts, the Council listed the 
following controls to improve cyber-security  
1. Encrypt all laptops and media.  
2. Carry out education on data awareness 
3. Put in place service automation  
4. Ensure that leavers from the council are prevented 
from accessing the Council’s IT 
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City of 
Atlanta, US 
In March 2018, Atlanta City in the US was 
affected by a cyber-attack that infiltrated the 
bulk of the municipal’s systems. The 
First, about 424 software by the city could not 
operate online. Residents could not undertake 
TR: The Council worked closely with the FBI and other relevant 
security agencies to investigate the attack. They also employed 
Secureworks, a cyber-security firm to support the investigations.  
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attackers demanded a ransom payment of 
approximately $50,000 in bitcoin. The 
attack has been blamed on the cybercrime 
group, SanSam, which has been involved in 
various attacks. 
basic public tasks that relied on the City’s systems, 
such as paying for parking tickets and utility bills. 
Key information across the City’s public services, 
including legal documents dating back to almost 
10 years were lost.  
It took 5 days for employees to be able to access 
their computers, slowing down work and the 
council’s ability to offer core services, including 
courts and police to clients. In fact, it took longer 
for some employees to regain access to the system.   
The Council spent $2.7 million in emergency 
contracts.  
Employees were asked not to power on any government 
computers.  
The Council deployed a number of contractors as an emergency 
measure to recover its activities. It also undertook software 
upgrades and had plans of buying new gadgets including laptops, 
mobile phones and tablets.  
Synthesized from: [57], [62]–[97] 
